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StandardMarkovian optimal stopping problems are consistent in the sense
that the first entrance time into the stopping set is optimal for each initial
state of the process. Clearly, the usual concept of optimality cannot in a
straightforward way be applied to non-standard stopping problems with-
out this time-consistent structure. This paper is devoted to the solution of
time-inconsistent stopping problems with the reward depending on the ini-
tial state using an adaptation of Strotz’s consistent planning. More precisely,
we give a precise equilibrium definition — of the type subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium based on pure Markov strategies. In general, such equilibria do
not always exist and if they exist they are in general not unique. We, how-
ever, develop an iterative approach to finding equilibrium stopping times for
a general class of problems and apply this approach to one-sided stopping
problems on the real line. We furthermore prove a verification theorem based
on a set of variational inequalities which also allows us to find equilibria. In
the case of a standard optimal stopping problem, we investigate the connec-
tion between the notion of an optimal and an equilibrium stopping time. As
an application of the developed theory we study a selling strategy problem
under exponential utility and endogenous habit formation.
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1 Introduction
Consider a Markovian process X with state space E ⊆ Rd and the problem of choosing
a stopping time τ in order to maximize the expected discounted reward
Ex(e
−rτF (Xτ , x)), for each current state x ∈ E.
Note that the dependence of the reward F (Xτ , x) on the current state x implies that
this is not a standard optimal stopping problem. Specifically, the problem is inconsistent
in the sense that we cannot generally expect the existence of an optimal stopping time
that is independent of the current state x. In other words, if an optimal stopping time is
optimal for the current state x, then it will generally not be optimal at a later time, call
it t, after adjusting the reward, since the then current state Xt will typically be different
from x. Optimal stopping and more general optimal control problems with this property
are called time-inconsistent.
It is clear that the time-inconsistency implies that the usual notion of optimality cannot
be applied straightforwardly — it must first be clarified how the time-inconsistent stop-
ping problem should be interpreted. One way of dealing with this issue is of course to
treat the problem as a parametrized, by the current state x, optimal stopping problem
and ignore the issue that the corresponding optimal stopping time will not generally be
optimal at later times. In the literature this is known as a pre-commitment strategy. In
the present paper we instead interpret the time-inconsistent stopping problem using a
game-theoretic approach where we let each state x correspond to an agent, who all play
a sequential game against each other regarding when to stop the process X — and then
we look for equilibrium strategies i.e. equilibrium stopping times. The type of equilibria
we consider are subgame perfect Nash equilibria based on pureMarkov strategies (known
as pure Markov perfect equilibria). Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a refinement of
the notion of Nash equilibrium for dynamic games suggested by Selten, see e.g. [38, 39],
relying on the concept of consistent planning of Strotz [40]. We remark that although
Strotz [40] studied dynamic utility maximization (a control problem) under inconsistency
essentially due to the reward being dependent on the current time, the essential idea of
the present paper relies on the creation of Strotz, although our presentation relies on
inconsistency due to the space variable.
In game-theory strategies are either pure or mixed. In the present paper we consider only
pure stopping strategies, which we define as entry times into sets in the state space, see
Remark 2.5 for a motivation. In [10] we consider mixed strategies for time-inconsistent
stopping problems of a different class compared to the present paper. Remark 2.5 contains
an explanation of some of the game-theory terms used in the present paper.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 1.1 we describe previous literature
related to time-inconsistent problems. In Section 2 we formulate the general time-
inconsistent stopping problem introduced above in more detail and define the notions
of pure Markov strategies and subgame perfect Nash equilibria in this setting. Here we
also show that optimal stopping times for standard (time-consistent) stopping problems
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are equilibrium stopping times, and that the reverse holds for one-dimensional absorbed
Wiener processes (a similar result for diffusions is presented in Section 5). We also present
an example with two essentially different equilibria and an example which proves that an
equilibrium (of the type we consider) does not always exist. In Section 3 we develop an
iterative approach to finding equilibrium stopping times in a general setting under certain
assumptions. As an application of this iterative approach we, in Section 4, study a class
of one-sided problems on the real line. In Section 5 we present a verification theorem for
time-inconsistent optimal stopping based on a set of variational inequalities that we call
the time-inconsistent variational inequalities. Illustrative examples are studied in Sections
3, 4, and 5. In Example 5.8 we apply the verification theorem to find equilibrium selling
strategies for an investor with exponential utility and endogenous habit formation.
1.1 Previous literature
Time-inconsistency in financial economics typically arises for either of the following rea-
sons:
(i) Endogenous habit formation,
(ii) Non-exponential discounting,
(iii) Mean-variance utility.
Stopping problems with (i) and (ii) can be formulated and studied in the framework of the
present paper whereas stopping problems of type (iii) can be dealt with in the framework
studied in [10]. Stopping problemswith (ii)—(iii) are described below. A stopping problem
with (i) is studied in Example 5.8. See also [6] for a short description of (i)—(iii).
There is a substantial financial economics literature that studies specific time-inconsistent
problems; in either continous or discrete time, for either stochastic or deterministic mod-
els, and using either game-theoretic or pre-commitment approaches. Historically impor-
tant papers include [20, 35, 37, 40]. We remark that most of these papers consider prob-
lems of control type. Papers in financial economics studying time-inconsistent stopping
problems include [2, 14, 15, 21].
As mentioned above, the first paper to use a game-theoretic approach — essentially based
on subgame perfect Nash equilibria— to time-inconsistency, there termed consistent plan-
ning, was [40], where a deterministic problem under non-exponential discounting in dis-
crete time is studied. Further financial economics research in this direction can be found
in [3, 20, 25, 35, 37].
Early papers of a more mathematical kind to consider the game-theoretic approach —
based on subgame perfect Nash equilibria — in time-inconsistent problems in continuous
time are [16, 18], who study optimal consumption and investment under non-exponential
(hyperbolic) discounting. Inspired by the approach of e.g. [16, 18], the first papers to
develop a general mathematical theory for finding subgame perfect Nash equilibria for
time-inconsistent stochastic control problems in Markovian models are [5, 6]. The main
feature of that theory is a generalization of the standard HJB equation called the extended
HJB system and the main result is a verification theorem saying that if a solution to the
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extended HJB system exists then it corresponds to an equilibrium. In [27] it is shown
that a regular equilibrium is necessarily a solution to an extended HJB system. Other
papers studying specific time-inconsistent control problems from a more mathematical
perspective include [7, 13, 17, 22, 26].
Papers of a more mathematical kind to study time-inconsistent stopping include [23] who
study a stopping problem with non-exponential discounting and [29, 33] (see the discus-
sion below). In [4] a game-theoretic approach inspired by Strotz’s consistent planning is
used to study a time-inconsistent stopping problemwith a mean standard deviation crite-
rion in discrete time. In [9] a class of stopping problems – which can be seen as American
options with guarantee – with the reward depending on the initial state are studied using
a pre-commitment approach. We refer to [6, 23, 29, 33] for short surveys of the literature
on time-inconsistent problems.
Endogenous habit formation problems (see Example 5.8) are time-inconsistent because
the reward depends on the current state. Stopping problems of this kind can therefore
be studied in the framework of the present paper. A version of the non-exponential dis-
counting stopping problem corresponds to maximizing
Et,x(δ(τ − t)F˜ (Xτ )) (1.1)
with respect to stopping times τ , where the discounting function δ : [0,∞) → [0, 1] is
a decreasing (non-exponential) function satisfying δ(0) = 1. Problem (1.1) can in our
framework be obtained by letting one of the dimensions ofX correspond to time, i.e., by
considering the time-space process.
Mean-variance problems are, however, time-inconsistent for the fundamentally different
reason that the expression to be maximized is a non-linear function of the expected value
of a reward. Hence, mean-variance problems cannot be studied in the present framework
(a mean-variance problem is however studied in [10]). A version of the mean-variance
stopping problem is to find a stopping time τ that maximizes
Ex(Xτ )− cV arx(Xτ ), where c > 0 is a fixed constant. (1.2)
In [33], this mean-variance stopping problem is studied for an underlying geometric
Brownian motion (i.e. a mean-variance selling problem in a Black-Scholes market). The
problem is interpreted and solved in two different ways, by the introduction of two differ-
ent definitions of optimality. Static optimality, corresponds to finding, for a fixed x > 0,
a stopping time that maximizes (1.2). The static optimality definition corresponds to a
pre-commitment approach. Dynamic optimality, corresponds to finding a stopping time
τ∗ such that there is no other stopping time σ with Px(EXτ∗ (Xσ) − cV arXτ∗ (Xσ) >
Xτ∗) > 0 for some x > 0. This is a novel interpretation of time-inconsistent problems,
that does not rely on game-theoretic arguments, see, however, Remark 3.3 below. We
remark that the concept of dynamic optimality is applicable also to the time-inconsistent
stopping problem considered in the present paper, as well as to time-inconsistent stochas-
tic control problems (both of the type considered in the present paper, cf. (i) and (ii), and
of the non-linear type, cf. (iii)), see [32, 34]. These references contain the first known
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time-consistent strategies that are optimal for constrained mean-variance portfolio selec-
tion problems in continuous time — we also remark that there are no known subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium strategies for these constrained problems, although [7] stud-
ies an unconstrained version. A crucial difference between the game-theoretic approach
based on Strotz’s consistent planning and the dynamic optimality approach is that the
game-theoretic equilibrium solution can be interpreted as the best control among those
that will actually be used in the future, while the dynamic optimality solution can be in-
terpreted as being the best with respect to all present states. We refer to [33] for a further
discussion of the difference between these two different approaches, see in particular the
paragraph before [33, Example 9]. We remark that [33] contains also a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium approach (based on Strotz’s idea) for stopping problems, see mainly [33,
Example 9]; this point is elaborated in the paragraph before Example 2.8 below. Time-
inconsistent stopping problems with more general non-linear functions of the expected
reward are studied in [29] using an approach which is inspired by [33].
2 Problem formulation
On the filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,Px)we consider a strongMarkov process
X = (Xt)t≥0 taking values in (E,B) where E ⊆ Rd and B is the corresponding Borel
σ-algebra and X0 = x ∈ E. We assume that the filtration satisfies the usual conditions
andX to have cádlág sample paths and to be quasi left continuous and that x 7→ Px(F ) is
measurable for eachF ∈ F . The associated expectations are denoted byEx. Without loss
of generality we assume that (Ω,F) equals the canonical space so that the shift operator
θ given by θt(ω)(s) = ω(t+ s) for ω = (ω(t))t≥0 ∈ Ω and t, s ≥ 0 is well-defined. The
class of stopping times with respect to (Ft)t≥0 is denoted byM.
Consider a function F : E × E → R and the problem of finding a stopping time τ such
that it maximizes, over the class of stopping timesM,
Jτ (x) := Ex
(
e−rτF (Xτ , x)1{τ<∞}
)
, for each x ∈ E,
where r ≥ 0 is a constant and — to guarantee that all expectations are well-defined —
the function F (·, y) is measurable and bounded from below for each fixed y ∈ E. For
the ease of exposition we will in the rest of the paper not explicitly write out indicator
functions of the type 1{τ<∞} in expected values, but instead implicitly assume that they
are there.
The difference in our formulation to usual Markovian optimal stopping problems is that
the reward F (Xτ , x) explicitly depends on the initial state X0 = x. In the standard
formulation, the reward F (Xτ , x) is independent of x. In that classical case, it is well-
known that— underminimal assumptions — an optimal stopping time isMarkovian in the
sense that it is a first entrance time into the stopping set, see, e.g., [36, I.2.2]. In particular,
this solution is consistent meaning that one rule is optimal for each initial state, i.e. such
problems are consistent with Wald-Bellman’s principle of optimality.
This kind of consistency can of course not be expected in our formulation. We therefore
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have to be careful how to reinterpret the concept of optimality. Clearly, we could choose
different stopping times for different starting points x. This, however, does not represent
the following interpretation of our problem:
We interpret the time-inconsistent stopping problem above as a stopping problem for a
personwhose preferences, identifiedwith the reward functionF (·, x), change as the state
x changes. Based on this we think of the person as comprising versions of herself, one
version for each state x. These versions of the person can then be thought of as agents
who play a sequential game against each other, where the game regards when to stop the
process X . Note that the number of players in this game is generally uncountable. Each
agent, i.e. each x-version of the person, then has the possibility, at x, to either stop, or
not stop. A reasonable definition of an equilibrium strategy, in this case an equilibrium
stopping time τˆ , should therefore be such that the following holds:
Under the assumption that each other version of the person uses τˆ then,
(i) no x-version of the person wants to stop in her state before τˆ , and
(ii) no x-version of the person wants to continue for an "infinitesimal" time if τˆ calls
for stopping.
We thus define an equilibrium stopping time τˆ using conditions which guarantee that no
agent wants to deviate from τˆ . Furthermore, we demand that the decision whether to
stop or not should depend directly only on the preferences of each agent x and not, for
example, on the outcome of some randomization procedure, or on events from the past
— that is, we consider pure stopping strategies cf. Definition 2.1 and Remark 2.5 (while
mixed stopping strategies are considered in [10]). These conditions are, in reverse order,
formalized in the following definitions.
Definition 2.1. A stopping time τ ∈ M is said to be a pure Markov strategy stopping
time if it is the entrance time of the state process into a set in the state space, more
specifically, if τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ S} for some measurable S ⊆ E. Denote the set of
such stopping times by N .
Definition 2.2. A stopping time τˆ ∈ N is said to be a (pureMarkov strategy) equilibrium
stopping time if, for all x ∈ E,
Jτˆ (x)− F (x, x) ≥ 0, and (2.1)
lim inf
hց0
Jτˆ (x)− Jτˆ◦θτh+τh(x)
Ex(τh)
≥ 0, (2.2)
where τh = inf{t ≥ 0 : |Xt −X0| ≥ h}.
Definition 2.3. If τˆ is a (pure Markov strategy) equilibrium stopping time then the func-
tion Jτˆ (x), x ∈ E, is said to be the (pure Markov strategy) equilibrium value function
corresponding to τˆ . The function
fτˆ (x, y) := Ex(e
−rτˆF (Xτˆ , y)), (x, y) ∈ E × E
is said to be the auxiliary function corresponding to τˆ .
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It follows that the equilibrium value function satisfies
Jτˆ (x) = fτˆ (x, x) = Ex(e
−rτˆF (Xτˆ , x)), x ∈ E.
This paper is devoted to the question of how to find equilibrium stopping times (of the
type in Definition 2.2).
The interpretation of (2.1) is that each x-agent should prefer the equilibrium strategy
over stopping directly. The interpretation of (2.2) is that each x-agent should prefer the
equilibrium strategy over not stopping on the short (stochastic) time interval [0, τh), over
which we interpret the x-agent as being in charge, given that the equilibrium strategy is
played from τh and onwards — here we remark that the numerator in (2.2) can in principle
be negative for each h > 0 and still comply with condition (2.2) by vanishing with order
Ex(τh).
Remark 2.4. The equilibrium definition (Definition 2.2) is essentially an adaptation of
Strotz’s consistent planning (subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) approach to the type of
stopping problems studied in the present paper. The definition is also inspired by similar
definitions for time-inconsistent stopping problems in financial economics, see [15]. The
definition can also be seen as an adaptation of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for
time-inconsistent stochastic control problems (which is itself an adaptation of Strotz’s
consistent planning), see e.g. [5, 6] and the references therein, when identifying stopping
timeswith binary controls (this is also noted in [15, Section 3.2]). We remark that a similar
identification is used in [33, Example 9] where a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium ap-
proach to stopping problems is also studied (see the paragraph before Example 2.8 below
for further details).
Remark 2.5. Let us informally describe some of the game theoretic jargon used above,
for a reference see e.g. [28]. A Markov strategy depends on past events that are payoff-
relevant. Markov strategies can be pure or mixed. A pure strategy is one that determines
the actions of the agents without randomization. In our setting, the actions of the agents
are to stop or not to stop, hence first entrance times correspond to pure strategies. A
mixed strategy is one that randomly selects pure strategies. In our situation, this could
be realized by extending the underlying filtration in a suitable way and consider general
stopping times with respect to this filtration. See Example 2.9 below for an illustration.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a strategy that forms a Nash equilibrium at any
time t, and a Markov perfect equilibrium is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which
all players use Markov strategies. Thus, Definition 2.2 corresponds to a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, and more specifically a pure Markov perfect equilibrium.
If the reward function F (x, y) does not depend on y, then our time-inconsistent stopping
problem is a standard (time-consistent) stopping problem corresponding to
Ex(e
−rτF (Xτ )). (2.3)
It is now natural to ask: is the equilibrium value function of the standard stopping problem
corresponding to (2.3) uniquely given by the optimal value function for (2.3)?
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We will answer this question as follows: Theorem 2.6 shows that if an optimal stopping
time for the standard stopping problem (2.3) exists, then the corresponding optimal value
function is also an equilibrium value function for (2.3). Theorem 2.7 and Theorem 5.6
show that the reverse holds for some cases.
Theorem 2.6. An optimal stopping time for the standard stopping problem (2.3) is an equi-
librium stopping time for (2.3).
Proof. If τ is an optimal stopping time in (2.3) then, trivially, the corresponding optimal
value function satisfies Jτ (x) ≥ F (x), which means that equilibrium condition (2.1)
is satisfied. To see that also equilibrium condition (2.2) is satisfied note that, trivially,
Jτ (x) ≥ Jτ◦θτh+τh(x), which means that the numerator in (2.2) is non-negative, for each
h, and hence that condition (2.2) holds. It follows that τ is an equilibrium stopping time,
by Definition 2.2.
Theorem 2.7. Suppose thatE = [0, 1] andX is a Wiener process absorbed at 0 and 1, and
r = 0. Suppose that an equilibrium stopping time τˆ for the standard stopping problem (2.3)
exists and that the equilibrium value function Jτˆ (x) = Ex(F (Xτˆ )) is continuous. Then, τˆ
is also an optimal stopping time for (2.3).
Proof. By definition the equilibrium value function is given by Jτˆ (x) = Ex(F (Xτˆ ))
where τˆ is the entry time into some set in the state space. By condition (2.1) it holds
that Jτˆ (x) dominates the reward function F (x). Under the stated assumptions, super-
harmonicity is equivalent to concavity. Hence, if we can prove that Jτˆ (x) is a concave
function then it follows that it is also a minimal dominating superharmonic function and,
by the standard theory, that τˆ is an optimal stopping time.
Use the strong Markov property and basic properties of the Wiener process to find that
condition (2.2) can for x ∈ (0, 1) be written as
lim inf
hց0
Jτˆ (x)− 12Jτˆ (x+ h)− 12Jτˆ (x− h)
h2
≥ 0.
This implies that
lim sup
hց0
−Jτˆ (x+ h)− Jτˆ (x− h) + 2Jτˆ (x)
h2
≥ 0. (2.4)
By a result from real analysis, see e.g. [1, Lemma 4.17] or [42], it follows, from (2.4), that
the function −Jτˆ (x) is convex (on (0, 1)), and hence Jτˆ (x) is concave.
In Example 2.8 we present an example with multiple equilibria and in Example 2.9 we
present an example with no equilibrium. Another example of a stopping problem with
multiple equilibria is presented in [33, Example 9]. There, however, a different inter-
pretation of the notion of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for stopping problems,
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compared to the present paper, is used as our condition (2.2) does not become relevant
and the players are identified with the time-coordinates of the time-space process.
Example 2.8. Let E = [0, 1] and X be a Wiener process absorbed at 0 and 1. Consider
the reward
F (x, y) =
{
1, x ∈ {0, 1},
−|x− y|, x ∈ (0, 1).
It is easy to verify that τˆ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ {0, 1}} is an equilibrium stopping time:
to see this note that, Jτˆ (x) = 1 ≥ F (x, x), which means that (2.1) holds, and Jτˆ (x) =
1 ≥ Jτ (x) for any stopping time τ , which implies that the numerator of (2.2) is non-
negative for each h, which implies that (2.2) holds. It is also easy to see that τ˜ = 0 is
an equilibrium stopping time: Condition (2.1) holds trivially. Moreover, for x ∈ (0, 1), it
holds that Jτ˜ (x) = 0 ≥ Jτ˜◦θτh+τh(x) for sufficiently small h (i.e. immediate stopping is
better than continuing a short while), which means that (2.2) holds. For x ∈ {0, 1}, (2.2)
is easily verified. The corresponding equilibrium value functions are given by Jτˆ (x) = 1
for x ∈ E, and Jτ˜ (x) = 0 for x ∈ (0, 1), Jτ˜ (x) = 1 for x ∈ {0, 1}.
Example 2.9. As mentioned above, in standard Markovian optimal stopping problems,
we only have to consider first entrance times and the filtration generated byX . Moreover,
any additional information included in some larger filtration cannot improve the optimal
value function as long as the process isMarkovian alsowith respect to the larger filtration.
Similarly, in Markovian Dynkin-type stopping games it is also the case that equilibria can
be found (under technical assumptions) as first-entrance times, see [19]. This is however
not the case for equilibrium stopping problems in general as we will see in the following
example.
Consider a discrete time process X that lives on the state space E = {∂1, a, b, ∂2} ⊆ R
where ∂1 and ∂2 are absorbing states and
Pa(X1 = ∂1) = Pa(X1 = b) = Pb(X1 = a) = Pb(X1 = ∂2) =
1
2
.
Let r = 0 and defineX∞ = limt→∞Xt.
∂1 a b ∂2
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
(X can of course be embedded into a continuous time Markov chain, so that we do not
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leave the setting of this paper). Let
F (x, a) =


0, x = ∂1
1, x = a
3, x = b
0, x = ∂2,
F (x, b) =


4, x = ∂1
0, x = a
1, x = b
0, x = ∂2
and F (·, ∂i) = 0 for i = 1, 2. We will now show that no entrance time of the state process
X into a subset S ⊆ E can be an equilibrium stopping time, i.e. no pure Markov strategy
equilibrium stopping time exists. We do this by investigating all such stopping sets S.
Since ∂1 and ∂2 are absorbing we can without loss of generality assume that ∂1, ∂2 ∈ S.
It remains to consider the following four sets:
(i) S = {∂1, ∂2, a, b}: This stopping set corresponds to the rule that both agent a
and agent b should always stop when they get the chance. But this rule cannot
correspond to an equilibrium stopping time, since agent a would obtain 1 when
stopping but she obtains 12 · 0 + 12 · 3 = 32 > 1 (in expectation) if she deviates from
the rule by never stopping.
(ii) S = {∂1, ∂2, a}: This stopping set corresponds to the rule that a should stop and b
should continue. But this cannot correspond to an equilibrium stopping time, since
agent b obtains 12 · 0 + 12 · 0 = 0 when continuing and 1 > 0 when stopping.
(iii) S = {∂1, ∂2, b}: This stopping set corresponds to the rule that b should stop and
a should continue. Let V0,0(b) denote the value that agent b obtains when not
following this rule. Then V0,0(b) =
1
2 ·0+ 12(12 ·4+ 12V0,0(b))⇒ V0,0(b) = 43 . Note
that agent b obtains 1 < V0,0(b) when stopping. This means that the set {∂1, ∂2, b}
cannot be the stopping set of an equilibrium stopping time.
(iv) S = {∂1, ∂2}: This stopping set corresponds to the rule that both a and b should
continue. Since agent a obtains zero in the absorbing states she prefers to stop since
this gives her 1.
The above implies that there is no equilibrium stopping time in the set of pure Markov
strategy stopping times. However, a mixed strategy equilibrium stopping time (in the
sense defined below for this example) does exist, as we shall now see. Consider the stop-
ping time τp,q defined as follows: for any t ∈ N0 given {τp,q ≥ t}, if Xt ∈ {∂1, ∂2}
then τp,q = t, if Xt = a then τp,q = t with probability p, and if Xt = b then τp,q = t
with probability q (assume that the filtration (Ft)t≥0 is large enough for τp,q be be a stop-
ping time with respect to (Ft)t≥0). Heuristically, the stopping time τp,q corresponds to
the agents a and b flipping biased coins in order to decide whether to stop or not. Let
Vp,q(x), x ∈ {a, b}, denote the (expected) value that agent x obtains when τp,q is used.
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The following ad hoc definition, which is inspired by [41], will be used only in the present
example:
A stopping time of the type τp,q (defined above) is said to be a mixed strategy stopping
time. A mixed strategy stopping time τp′,q′ is said to be a mixed strategy equilibrium
stopping time if Vp,q′(a) ≤ Vp′,q′(a) for all p ∈ [0, 1] and Vp′,q(b) ≤ Vp′,q′(b) for all
q ∈ [0, 1].
Heuristically, a mixed strategy equilibrium stopping time τp′,q′ is a strategy from which
neither agent a (nor b) wants to deviate from by choosing another mixed strategy τp,q′
(τp′,q), i.e. they do not want to deviate by choosing another biased coin (including degen-
erate biased coins, i.e. with p, q ∈ {0, 1}).
We obtain
Vp,q(a) = p · 1 + (1− p)
[
1
2
· 0 + 1
2
(
q · 3 + (1− q)
(
1
2
Vp,q(a) +
1
2
· 0
))]
⇒
Vp,q(a) =
p+ 32 (1− p)q
1− 14(1− p)(1− q)
, and
Vp,q(b) = q · 1 + (1− q)
[
1
2
· 0 + 1
2
(
p · 0 + (1− p)
(
1
2
Vp,q(b) +
1
2
· 4
))]
⇒
Vp,q(b) =
q + (1− p)(1− q)
1− 14(1− p)(1− q)
.
Choose p′ = 15 and q
′ = 35 , i.e. consider the mixed strategy stopping time τ 15 , 35 . The corre-
sponding expected values are V 1
5
, 3
5
(a) = V 1
5
, 3
5
(b) = 1. All we need to do in order to verify
that τ 1
5
, 3
5
is a mixed strategy equilibrium stopping time, is to check that neither agent a
nor agent b wants to deviate from it, i.e. we need to verify that Vp, 3
5
(a) ≤ V 1
5
, 3
5
(a) = 1
for all p ∈ [0, 1] and that V 1
5
,q(b) ≤ V 1
5
, 3
5
(b) = 1 for all q ∈ [0, 1]. This is easily done as
in fact Vp, 3
5
(a) = V 1
5
,q(b) = 1 for all p, q ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that the stopping time τ 1
5
, 3
5
is
indeed a mixed strategy equilibrium stopping time.
3 A forward iteration approach
The previous example illustrates that there is no hope to come up with a general method
to find equilibrium stopping times (of the pure Markov strategy type, see Definition 2.2).
In particular cases, this can however be done. We now propose an approach for construct-
ing a candidate for an equilibrium stopping time by solving a — possibly terminating —
sequence of ordinary optimal stopping problems. More precisely, we construct a set Sˆ
and prove that — under certain assumptions — the first entrance time τSˆ into Sˆ is an
equilibrium stopping time.
To this end, write
S0 := ∅, v0(x, y) := sup
τ
Ex(e
−rτF (Xτ , y)).
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and define recursively for all n ≥ 1
Sn := {x ∈ E : vn−1(x, x) = F (x, x)},
vn(x, y) := sup
τ≤τSn
Ex(e
−rτF (Xτ , y)).
Note that vn(·, y) is the value function of an ordinary optimal stopping problem for the
process X absorbed in Sn. It holds that S1, S2, ... is an increasing sequence of sets and
we assume that
S1, S2, . . . are closed sets. (A1)
We denote the closure of the union
⋃∞
n=0 Sn in E by Sˆ. Moreover, vn is decreasing
in n and therefore converges to a limit v∞. By the construction of the problem, it is
furthermore natural to assume that
v∞(x, x) = sup
τ≤τ
Sˆ
Ex(e
−rτF (Xτ , x)) for all x ∈ E. (A2)
Our candidate for the equilibrium stopping time is now the first entrance time τSˆ into Sˆ.
The heuristic motivation is as follows: In case it is rational for the agent in state y = x to
stop immediately in the starting stateX0 = x in problem vn(x, x), n minimal, say, there
is no reason for her not to stop immediately in x under the global time τSˆ as τSˆ ≤ τSn .
Hence, the agent should accept τSˆ when x ∈ Sˆ.
On the other hand, in the casex 6∈ Sˆ, there exists a stopping time τ ≤ τSˆ that gives strictly
more expected reward than to stop immediately. In case the structure of the problem is
such that
(2.2) is satisfied with τˆ = τSˆ for all x ∈ Sˆ\
⋃
n∈N
Sn, (A3)
and
F (x, x) ≤ Ex(e−rτSˆF (Xτ
Sˆ
, x)) for all x 6∈ Sˆ, (A4)
we see that it is also in this case optimal for the agent to accept τSˆ . Indeed:
Theorem 3.1. Under the assumptions (A1) – (A4), the stopping time τSˆ defined above is an
equilibrium stopping time.
Proof. Write τˆ = τSˆ for short. Let us first consider x 6∈ Sˆ. As Sˆ is closed, we find h0 > 0
such that the open ball B(x, h0) around x with radius h0 is a subset of Sˆ
c. Therefore,
Jτˆ (x) = Jτˆ◦θτh+τh(x)
for all h ≤ h0, so that (2.2) is fulfilled automatically. Furthermore, (A4) warrants (2.1).
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For x ∈ Sˆ\⋃n∈N Sn, (2.1) holds trivially as τˆ calls for immediate stopping, and (A3)
yields (2.2).
It remains to check that the equilibrium conditions (2.1) and (2.2) are fulfilled for x ∈⋃
n∈N Sn. In this case (2.1) holds trivially. For the second property, find n ∈ N such that
x ∈ Sn \Sn−1. As Sn−1 is closed, there exists ǫ0 > 0 such that the ballB(x, ǫ0) around x
with radius ǫ0 is a subset of S
c
n−1. Then, for each h < ǫ0 it holds that τˆ ◦θτh+τh ≤ τSn−1
and therefore
F (x, x) = vn(x, x) = sup
τ≤τSn−1
Ex(e
−rτF (Xτ , x))
≥ Ex(e−rτˆ◦θτh+τhF (Xτˆ◦θτh+τh , x)) = Jτˆ◦θτh+τh(x),
where we used that x ∈ Sn implies vn(x, x) = F (x, x) and vn−1(x, x) = F (x, x). This
yields
lim inf
hց0
Jτˆ (x)− Jτˆ◦θτh+τh(x)
Ex(τh)
= lim inf
hց0
F (x, x)− Jτˆ◦θτh+τh(x)
Ex(τh)
≥ 0.
Remark 3.2. We now discuss the assumptions above.
• On (A1): Optimal stopping sets are well-known to be closed under weak assump-
tions, see [36], I.2.2. In particular, (A1) is obviously fulfilled if
x 7→ F (x, x), x 7→ vn(x, x) are continuous.
• On (A2): This assumption warrants that — in the sense described above — the opti-
mal stopping sets of the problems related to vn converge to the optimal stopping set
of the limiting problem. In particular, if the procedure terminates, i.e., there exists
n0 ∈ N such that Sn0 = Sn0+1, then assumption (A2) is automatically fulfilled.
• On (A3): This assumption is trivially fulfilled when the procedure terminates. In
general, it can be understood as a version of a smooth fit property for the limiting
problem.
• On (A4): In contrast to the previous conditions, (A4) is more than a technical reg-
ularity assumption. As mentioned above, it is by construction clear that for x 6∈ Sˆ,
there exists a stopping time τ ≤ τSˆ with strictly larger expected reward than to
stop immediately. But it is not clear in general that τSˆ also has this property. As
discussed at the end of this section, Example 3.5 is a counterexample.
Remark 3.3. In some cases of interest, for example in the one-dimensional case of Section
4, the procedure terminates already after one step, i.e.
Sˆ = {x ∈ E : F (x, x) = sup
τ
Ex(e
−rτF (Xτ , x))}.
Under (A1) it holds thatXτˆ ∈ Sˆ, where we write τˆ = τSˆ as above. Hence, in the case of
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termination after one step, we obtain, using the strong Markov property, for all x ∈ E
and all stopping times σ,
Px
(
EXτˆ
(
e−rσF (Xσ ,X0)
)
> F (Xτˆ ,Xτˆ )
)
= 0.
Thismay be interpreted as an adaptationof the notion of dynamic optimality, see [33] (and
also Section 1.1), to our setup. Hence, in this case the equilibrium (a local property) is in
this sense also dynamically optimal (a global property). We remark that the equilibrium in
Example 3.4 below is not dynamically optimal. A (trivial) sufficient condition for S1 = S2,
i.e. for the procedure to terminate after one step, in the general case, is that: for all y /∈ S1
it holds that S1 ⊆ Sy , where Sy is defined as the stopping set for the standard stopping
problem v0(x, y) = supτ Ex(e
−rτF (Xτ , y)) where y is fixed. To see this note that in this
case, if x ∈ S2\S1 then: (a) v1(x, x) = F (x, x) (by definition of S2 and x ∈ S2) and, (b)
v0(x, x) = supτ Ex(e
−rτF (Xτ , x)) = supτ≤τS1 Ex(e
−rτF (Xτ , x)) = v1(x, x) (to see
this use that x /∈ S1 and the sufficient condition, which imply that the restriction τ ≤ τS1
is not relevant for optimality). From (a) and (b) follows that v0(x, x) = F (x, x) which
implies that x ∈ S1 and we have thus reached a contradiction. Hence, no x satisfying
x ∈ S2\S1 exists, i.e. S2 ⊆ S1. Moreover, since {Sn} is an increasing sequence it holds
that S1 ⊆ S2, and the claim follows. A more interesting sufficient condition for the one-
dimensional case is provided in Theorem 4.3, see also the proof.
We close this section by discussing two examples. A general class of examples with a
one-sided equilibrium stopping time found by this approach is discussed separately in
Section 4.
Example 3.4. We now consider an underlying one-dimensional Wiener process X and
fix a discount rate r > 0. To illustrate the theory with an explicit example, we look at the
reward function
F (x, y) :=
{
x+ , y ≥ 0,
(−x)+ , y < 0.
A (somewhat artificial) financial interpretation is that the holder of a perpetual American
option with strike 0 in a Bachelier market is uncertain whether she has bought a put or
a call option. She is inherently optimistic and changes her belief depending on the state
the process is in. If the current state is non-negative, i.e. y ≥ 0, she believes that the
derivative is a call, and a put otherwise. Using standard approaches to the solution of
optimal stopping problems, such as a free boundary approach or the harmonic function
technique of [8], it is straightforward to find that for fixed y ≥ 0
v0(x, y) = sup
τ
Ex(e
−rτF (Xτ , y)) =
{
x , x ≥ x1,
a1e
cx , x < x1,
where c =
√
2r, x1 = 1/c and a1 = 1/(ec). Due to symmetry, we have for y < 0 that
v0(x, y) = v0(−x,−y). Therefore,
S1 = (−∞,−x1] ∪ [x1,∞).
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Now, we can go on iteratively to find vn and Sn again using standard arguments for
optimal stopping problems for diffusions. Writing
fn(x) = ane
−cx + bnecx,
we try to find xn+1, an, bn such that
fn(−xn−1) = 0,
fn(xn) = xn,
f ′n(xn) = 1.
This system is indeed solvable and the solution is given by
an =
1
2
ecxn
(
xn − 1
c
)
,
bn =
1
2
e−cxn
(
xn +
1
c
)
and x = xn is the unique solution in (0, xn−1) of
e2cx = e−2cxn−1
1
c + x
1
c − x
.
Then,
Sn = (−∞,−xn] ∪ [xn,∞)
and for y ≥ 0
vn(x, y) =


x , x ≥ xn+1,
fn(x) , −xn+1 ≤ x < xn+1,
0 , x < −xn+1
and, as above, for y < 0 it holds that vn(x, y) = vn(−x,−y). It is easily seen that xn
converges monotonically to the unique solution x = x∗ in (0, 1/c) of
e4cx =
1
c + x
1
c − x
,
so that
Sˆ = (−∞,−x∗] ∪ [x∗,∞)
and for y ≥ 0
v∞(x, y) =


x , x ≥ x∗,
f∞(x) , −x∗ ≤ x < x∗,
0 , x < −x∗
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with
f∞(x) =
1
2
ecx
∗
(
x∗ − 1
c
)
e−cx +
1
2
e−cx
∗
(
x∗ +
1
c
)
ecx.
Again, v∞(x, y) = v∞(−x,−y) for y < 0.
−2 −1 0 1 2
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Figure 1 The functions x 7→ v∞(x, x) and x 7→ F (x, x) for c = 1. Here, x∗ ≈ 0.9575.
It is straightforwardly verified that (A1) and (A2) are fulfilled. (A3) holds by the smooth-
ness of the function v∞ in x∗. (A4) could be verified using the theory developed in the
following section. Here, it is however immediately checked elementary due to the con-
vexity of f∞ for x ≥ 0 and f ′∞(x∗) = 1. Hence, Theorem 3.1 yields that
τˆ = inf{t ≥ 0 : |Xt| ≥ x∗}
is an equilibrium stopping time.
Example 3.5. We now come back to Example 2.9. We already know that there is no pure
Markov strategy equilibrium stopping time, so that the approach described in this section
cannot be successful. Indeed, S1 = {∂1, ∂2} and the procedure terminates after this
step. As argued in Example 2.9 (iv), this is no equilibrium stopping time. More precisely,
condition (A4) fails to hold true.
4 A class of one-sided solvable problems with potential
jumps
As a more advanced application of the method in the previous example, we consider a
Markov process on the real line. To construct an equilibriumstopping time for awide class
of examples, we consider the general setting of [12] for the auxiliary optimal stopping
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problems with value function
vy(x) = sup
τ
Ex(e
−rτF (Xτ , y)), y ∈ R. (4.1)
That is, we assume that each function F (·, y) has a representation of the form
F (x, y) = Ex
(
Qy(MT )
)
,
whereMt := sup0≤s≤tXs, t ≥ 0, denotes the running maximum process ofX and T is
an exponentially with parameter r distributed random variable independent ofX . In this
section we assume that r > 0. At first sight, it is not clear at all why such a representation
should exist. However, as detailed in Section 2.2 of [12], it always exists under suitable
integrability and smoothness assumptions. More explicitly, it is given by
Qy(z) :=
1
r
∫ z
−∞
(r −AX)F (u, y)Px(XT ∈ du|MT = z),
Px(XT ∈ du|MT = z) := Px(XT ∈ du , MT ∈ dz)/Px(MT ∈ dz),
where AX denotes the (extended) infinitesimal generator of X .
Remark 4.1. If AX is applied to a function E × E → R then AX should, here and in the
following, be understood to only act on the first variable.
The conditional density used above can be found (semi-)explicitly for general Lévy pro-
cesses and diffusions, so that also Qy is given in analytical terms in these cases. The
following result, which follows directly from Theorem 2.5 in [12], then leads to the solu-
tion of the auxiliary optimal stopping problems in case they are of a one-sided form:
Lemma 4.2. Assume that for each y there exists a point x∗y such that
(B1) Qy(x) ≤ 0 for x ≤ x∗y ,
(B2) Qy(x) is positive and non-decreasing for x > x
∗
y .
Then, the value function of the auxiliary optimal stopping problem (4.1) is given by
vy(x) = Ex
(
Qy(MT )1{MT≥x∗y}
)
and
τ∗y := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ x∗y}
is an optimal stopping time.
Now, using the approach described in Section 3, we obtain the following verification the-
orem for problems where the underlying auxiliary optimal stopping problems are one-
sided.
Theorem 4.3. In the one-dimensional setting of this section assume that for each y there
exists a point x∗y such that (B1) and (B2) hold true. Furthermore, assume that there exists a
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point x∗ such that x∗y ≤ y for y ≥ x∗ and x∗y ≥ x∗ for y ≤ x∗. Then
τˆ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ x∗}
is an equilibrium stopping time.
Remark 4.4. The conditions of Theorem 4.3 imply that if the function y 7→ x∗y is contin-
uous then x∗ is the unique fixed point of that function.
Proof. Note that Lemma 4.2 yields that the forward iteration sequence of Section 3 is
given by
S1 = [x
∗,∞)
and the procedure then terminates i.e. S1 = S2 = S3 = ... = Sˆ and S1 is closed (this
can easily be seen directly and it also follows from the following argument). To apply
Theorem 3.1, it remains to check (A4), i.e.
F (x, x) ≤ Ex(e−rτˆF (Xτˆ , x)) for all x < x∗.
This, however, holds as
F (x, x) = Ex
(
Qx(MT )
) ≤ Ex (Qx(MT )1{MT≥x∗}),
where we used that Qx(MT ) is non-positive on {MT < x∗} ⊆ {MT < x∗x} by (B1). We
conclude by noting that Lemma 2 in [11] yields
Ex
(
Qx(MT )1{MT≥x∗}
)
= Ex(e
−rτˆF (Xτˆ , x)).
Remark 4.5. By applying the previous results to−X , we immediately obtain an analogous
result for the case that the auxiliary optimal stopping sets are of left-sided type (−∞, x∗y].
Example 4.6. To illustrate the general approach above, we consider a perpetual Ameri-
can call problem with state-dependent strikeK(y) in a general Lévy market. One inter-
pretation is an investor who has forgotten the concerted strike of the option. Depending
on the state of the price process, she changes her opinion on the concerted strike — this
situation is of course typically not realistic and the example is included only in order to
illustrate the theory, however, see Remark 4.7. More concretely, her reward function for
the log-price processX has the structure
F (x, y) = (ex −K(y))+,
where we assume that the function K : R → (0,∞) is continuous and non-increasing;
the interpretation of this is that the investor believes the strike to be lower when the asset
price is higher. LetX be a general Lévy process. To avoid trivial cases, we assumeX not
to be a subordinator and to fulfill E0(e
X1) < er . For technical reasons, we first ignore
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the (·)+, i.e. we change the reward function to
F˜ (x, y) = ex −K(y),
which makes some arguments and notations in the following shorter. Using the approach
from [12], or just by guessing, we see that the function Qy is given by
Qy(x) = ae
x −K(y),
where a = 1/E0 e
MT < 1, see also [30]. The value of a can be found more explicitly for
many classes of processes. For example, for Lévy processes without positive jumps,MT is
exponentially distributed. In the case of a Wiener processX , we obtain a =
√
2r−1√
2r
. The
optimal stopping boundary for the auxiliary problem is therefore, by Lemma 4.2, given
by x∗y = log(K(y)/a). Now use the properties of K(·) to verify that the conditions of
Theorem 4.3 are satisfied and that there exits a (unique) fixed point
x∗ = log(K(x∗)/a).
It follows from Theorem 4.3 that the equilibrium stopping time for the reward function
F˜ (x, y) is given by
τˆ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ x∗}. (4.2)
We may therefore conclude that the corresponding equilibrium value function J˜τˆ (x) :=
Ex
(
e−rτˆ F˜ (Xτˆ , x)
)
and the reward function F˜ (x, y) satisfy the equilibrium properties
(2.1) and (2.2).
In order to show that (4.2) is an equilibrium stopping time also for the original reward
function F (x, y) = (ex − K(y))+, let us verify that also Jτˆ (x) := Ex
(
e−rτˆF (Xτˆ , x)
)
and F (x, y) satisfy (2.1) and (2.2): First, note that if x is such that ex
∗ −K(x) ≥ 0, then
J˜τˆ (x) = Ex
(
e−rτˆ (eXτˆ −K(x))) = Ex (e−rτˆ (eXτˆ −K(x))+) = Jτˆ (x), and similarly
J˜τˆ◦θτh+τh(x) = Jτˆ◦θτh+τh(x). Moreover, if x is such that e
x∗ − K(x) < 0, then we are
in the continuation region and hence τˆ = τˆ ◦ θτh + τh for sufficiently small h. It follows
that Jτˆ (x) = Jτˆ◦θτh+τh(x) for sufficiently small h. We conclude that Jτˆ (x) satisfies (2.2).
Second, note that if x ≥ x∗ then Jτˆ (x) = F (x, x) and (2.1) follows trivially. Let us
deal with the case x < x∗. If x is such that ex − K(x) < 0 then F (x, x) = 0, and
since Jτˆ (x) ≥ 0, it follows that (2.1) satisfied. If x is such that ex − K(x) ≥ 0 then
ex
∗ −K(x) > 0 which implies that Jτˆ (x) = J˜τˆ (x) and F˜ (x, x) = F (x, x). We conclude
that Jτˆ (x) and F (x, x) satisfy (2.1).
We have thus shown that the equilibrium stopping time for the original rewardF (x, y) =
(ex−K(y))+ is also given by (4.2) and it follows that the corresponding equilibrium value
function can be written as
Jτˆ (x) =
{
ex −K(x), x ≥ x∗,
Ex
(
e−rτˆ
(
eXτˆ −K(x))+) , x < x∗,
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where more explicitly, for x with logK(x) < x∗,
Ex
(
e−rτˆ
(
eXτˆ −K(x))+) = Ex (e−rτˆ (eXτˆ −K(x)))
= aEx
(
eMT 1{MT≥x∗}
)−K(x)Px(MT ≥ x∗),
Remark 4.7. A put-version of Example 4.6 can be interpreted — economicallymore mean-
ingful — as an equilibrium selling problem under endogenous habit formation and expo-
nential utility in a Bachelier market. That problem is, however, analyzed and discussed
in the more realistic Black-Scholes market in Example 5.8.
5 The time-inconsistent variational inequalities
In the rest of the paper we assume that the state process X is the strong solution to the
d-dimensional SDE
dXt = µ(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dWt, X0 = x ∈ E, (5.1)
whereW is an r-dimensional Wiener process, the state spaceE ⊆ Rd is an open set, and
the deterministic functions µ and σ are continuous. Standard conditions for the existence
of a strong solution to (5.1) can be found in e.g. [24]. Note that we do not exclude the
possibility that E = Rd. The generator AX is now given by the differential operator
AX =
d∑
i
µi(x)
∂
∂xi
+
1
2
d∑
i,j
ai,j(x)
∂2
∂xixj
, a(x) := σ(x)σT (x).
5.1 A heuristic derivation of the time-inconsistent variational
inequalities
In this subsection we heuristically derive the time-inconsistent variational inequalities.
We remark that this section is only of motivational value and that there are no claims
of rigor in the derivation. In this subsection we consider r = 0 for the ease of expo-
sition. Suppose an equilibrium stopping time τˆ exists, see Definition 2.2. Recall that
τh = inf{t ≥ 0 : |Xt − X0| ≥ h} and let fτˆ (Xτh , x) denote the auxiliary function
that uses the equilibrium stopping time given the starting value Xτh . Given sufficient
regularity, we use the strong Markov property to see that
Jτˆ◦θτh+τh(x) := Ex(F (Xτˆ◦θτh+τh , x))
= Ex(EXτh (F (Xτˆ , x)))
= Ex(fτˆ (Xτh , x)) (5.2)
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and Itô’s formula to obtain
Ex(fτˆ (Xτh , x)) = fτˆ (x, x) + Ex
(∫ τh
0
AXfτˆ (Xt, x)dt
)
, (5.3)
where we recall that the differential operator AX operates only on the first variable. We
now use the dominated convergence theorem, Lebesgue’s differentiation theorem, (5.2),
(5.3) and Jτˆ (x) = fτˆ (x, x) (cf. Definition 2.3) to obtain, under sufficient regularity,
lim inf
hց0
Jτˆ (x)− Jτˆ◦θτh+τh(x)
Ex(τh)
= lim inf
hց0
fτˆ (x, x)− Ex(fτˆ (Xτh , x))
Ex(τh)
= lim inf
hց0
Ex
(∫ τh
0 −AXfτˆ (Xt, x)dt
)
Ex(τh)
= −AXfτˆ (x, x).
This, of course, reflects the well-known characterization of the infinitesimal generator
due to Dynkin. The definition of an equilibrium stopping time in Definition 2.2 therefore
translates to AXfτˆ (x, x) ≤ 0 and Jτˆ (x)−F (x, x) ≥ 0. Now note that Jτˆ (x) = fτˆ (x, x)
implies that the equilibrium value function Jτˆ (x) is completely determined by the auxil-
iary function fτˆ (x, y). We therefore summarize the above in terms of the auxiliary func-
tion:
fτˆ (x, x) ≥ F (x, x), x ∈ E (5.4)
AXfτˆ (x, x) ≤ 0, x ∈ E.
For any x, stopping yields the valueF (x, x). Using (5.4) we see that it is therefore optimal,
for the x-agent, to stop if and only if fτˆ (x, x) = F (x, x). Suppose that the set
C = {x ∈ E : fτˆ (x, x) > F (x, x)}
is open, where C is said to be the continuation region. It follows that the corresponding
equilibrium stopping time is the first exit time from C , or analogously the first entrance
time into the stopping region E\C , i.e
τE\C = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ E\C} = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈ C}, (5.5)
which implies that fτˆ (x, y) = Ex(F (XτE\C , y)) for all x and y. By (5.5) it is also clear that
if x ∈ E\C , then τE\C = 0 which implies that fτˆ (x, y) = Ex(F (XτE\C , y)) = F (x, y).
It therefore holds, for any y, that
fτˆ (x, y) = F (x, y), x ∈ E\C.
Moreover, since fτˆ (x, y) = Ex(F (XτE\C , y)) it follows that fτˆ (Xt, y) is a martingale on
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C , for any fixed y, given sufficient regularity. Hence, for any fixed y,
AXfτˆ (x, y) = 0, x ∈ C.
Let us summarize our findings. If an equilibrium stopping time exists then, under the
assumption of sufficient regularity, it is given by τE\C defined in (5.5) and the auxiliary
function fτˆ (x, y) = Ex(F (XτE\C , y)) satisfies
AXfτˆ (x, x) ≤ 0, x ∈ E,
and for any fixed y ∈ E
AXfτˆ (x, y) = 0, x ∈ C,
fτˆ (x, y)− F (x, y) = 0, x ∈ E\C,
where
C = {x ∈ E : fτˆ (x, x) > F (x, x)} .
We call the expressions above the time-inconsistent variational inequalities.
5.2 A verification theorem
Let us define the time-inconsistent variational inequalities in more detail.
Definition 5.1. A function f : E × E → R is said to satisfy the time-inconsistent varia-
tional inequalities if1
AXf(x, x)− rf(x, x) ≤ 0, x ∈ E\∂C, (5.6)
and, for each fixed y ∈ E,
AXf(x, y)− rf(x, y) = 0, x ∈ C, (5.7)
f(x, y)− F (x, y) = 0, x ∈ E\C, (5.8)
where
C := {x ∈ E : f(x, x) > F (x, x)} .
Moreover, the function f(·, y) : E → R must, for each fixed y ∈ E, satisfy:
(i) f(·, y) ∈ C(C) ∩ C2(C), where C denotes the closure of C in E,
(ii) f(·, y) ∈ C1(B(y, ǫ)) ∩ C2(B(y, ǫ)\∂C) for some ǫ > 0, where the second order
derivative is locally bounded (near ∂C),
(iii) f(·, y) is bounded on C .
1Recall that the differential operatorAX operates only on the first variable, in e.g. f(x, x).
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Lastly, we also demand that:
(iv) C is open and ∂C 6= ∅ is a Lipschitz surface2.
(v) lim supz /∈∂C→y(AXf(z, y)− rf(z, y)) ≤ 0, for y ∈ ∂C .
Theorem 5.2. Suppose that a function f : E ×E → R solves the time-inconsistent varia-
tional inequalities. Suppose that the state process X that solves the SDE (5.1) spends almost
no time on the boundary ∂C , i.e.∫ ∞
0
I∂C(Xt)dt = 0 a.s., (5.9)
and that
τˆ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈ C} <∞ a.s., (5.10)
for each starting value X0 = x ∈ E. Then,
• J : E → R, with J(x) := f(x, x), is an equilibrium value function,
• f : E × E → R is the corresponding auxiliary function, and
• the stopping time τˆ in (5.10) is the corresponding equilibrium stopping time.
Proof. Recall that the state spaceE ⊆ Rd is here assumed to be an open set and note that
E can here, without loss of generality, be taken to be connected, sinceX has continuous
sample paths. Let {Ck}∞k=1 be an increasing sequence of open, bounded and connected
sets withCk ⊆ C and ∪∞k=1Ck = C . Consider arbitrary y ∈ E and x ∈ C , which implies
that x ∈ Ck for any k ≥ k′, for some k′. Let τk = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈ Ck} ∧ k. Use (i), Itô’s
formula and (5.7) to obtain
f(x, y) = Ex
(
e−rτkf(Xτk , y)−
∫ τk
0
e−rt(AXf(Xt, y)− rf(Xt, y))dt
)
= Ex
(
e−rτkf(Xτk , y)
)
where the Itô integral has vanished by the continuity of σ(x), the continuity of the trajec-
tories of X , the continuity of ∂
2f(x,y)
∂x2
on C , and the boundedness of Xs on the bounded
stochastic interval [0, τk]. Note that (5.8), (i) and (iv) imply, for fixed y ∈ E, that f(·, y)
is continuous on C with f(x, y) = F (x, y) on ∂C , where ∂C 6= ∅ by assumption. Since,
f(·, y) is bounded onC (cf. (iii)) we may thus use the bounded convergence theorem, and
that τk → τˆ a.s. as k →∞ (cf. (5.10)), to obtain
f(x, y) = lim
k→∞
Ex
(
e−rτkf(Xτk , y)
)
= Ex
(
e−rτˆF (Xτˆ , y)
)
. (5.11)
Using (5.8) and (5.10) we see that this implies that
f(x, y) = Ex(e
−rτˆF (Xτˆ , y)) on E × E. (5.12)
2For a definition see [31, ch. 10].
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Definition 2.2, Definition 2.3 and (5.12) yield the following: if we can prove that
f(x, x)− F (x, x) ≥ 0, for each x ∈ E, and (5.13)
lim inf
hց0
f(x, x)− Jτˆ◦θτh+τh(x)
Ex(τh)
≥ 0, for each x ∈ E, (5.14)
then it follows that τˆ in (5.10) is an equilibrium stopping time, that J(x) :=f(x, x) is the
corresponding equilibrium value function and that f(x, y) is the corresponding auxiliary
function. Thus, all we have left to do is to show that (5.13) and (5.14) are satisfied.
Since f(x, y) solves the time-inconsistent variational inequalitieswe know that f(x, x) >
F (x, x) on C and f(x, x) = F (x, x) on E\C . It follows that (5.13) holds.
For each fixed y ∈ E, observe thatB(y, ǫ) andB(y, ǫ)∩C are open,B(y, ǫ)\∂(B(y, ǫ)∩
C) = B(y, ǫ)\∂C and that ∂(B(y, ǫ) ∩ C) is a Lipschitz surface (cf. (iv)). It therefore
follows from (ii) and Theorem D.1 in [31, App. D] that there exists, for each fixed y ∈ E
and some ǫ > 0, a sequence of functions {fi(·, y)}∞i=1 such that
(a) fi(·, y) ∈ C(B(y, ǫ)) ∩ C2(B(y, ǫ)) for each i,
(b) fi(·, y) converges to f(·, y) uniformly on compact subsets of B(y, ǫ) as i→∞,
(c) AXfi(·, y) converges toAXf(·, y) uniformly on compact subsets ofB(y, ǫ)\∂C as
i→∞,
(d) {AXfi(·, y)}∞i=1 is locally bounded on B(y, ǫ).
For any fixed x ∈ E, h ∈ (0, ǫ), i and k > 0 it thus follows from Itô’s formula that
fi(x, x) = Ex
(
e−rτh∧kfi(Xτh∧k, x)−
∫ τh∧k
0
e−rt(AXfi(Xt, x)− rfi(Xt, x))dt
)
.
where the Itô integral has vanished for reasons analogous to the above. Because of the
continuity in (a) and Xt being bounded on [0, τh] we can use the bounded convergence
theorem to obtain
fi(x, x) = lim
k→∞
fi(x, x)
= Ex
(
lim
k→∞
(
e−rτh∧kfi(Xτh∧k, x)−
∫ τh∧k
0
e−rt(AXfi(Xt, x)− rfi(Xt, x))dt
))
= Ex
(
e−rτhfi(Xτh , x)−
∫ τh
0
e−rt(AXfi(Xt, x)− rfi(Xt, x))dt
)
.
Set the undefined
∂2f(x,y)
∂x2
, x ∈ ∂C, to zero. Now use the convergence and boundedness
properties in (b), (c), and (d), and the regularity in (5.9), and the bounded convergence
theorem to obtain
f(x, x) = lim
i→∞
fi(x, x)
= Ex
(
lim
i→∞
(
e−rτhfi(Xτh , x)−
∫ τh
0
e−rt(AXfi(Xt, x)− rfi(Xt, x))dt
))
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= Ex
(
e−rτhf(Xτh , x)−
∫ τh
0
e−rt(AXf(Xt, x)− rf(Xt, x))dt
)
. (5.15)
Now use (5.12) and the strong Markov property to see that
Ex(e
−rτhf(Xτh , x)) = Ex(e
−rτh EXτh (e
−rτˆF (Xτˆ , x)))
= Ex(e
−r(τˆ◦θτh+τh)F (Xτˆ◦θτh+τh , x))
= Jτˆ◦θτh+τh(x), (5.16)
where we also relied on (iii) and (5.8). Using (5.15) and (5.16) we rewrite the left hand side
of (5.14) as
lim inf
hց0
−Ex
(∫ τh
0 e
−rt(AXf(Xt, x)− rf(Xt, x))dt
)
Ex(τh)
= − lim sup
hց0
Ex
(∫ τh
0 e
−rt(AXf(Xt, x)− rf(Xt, x))dt
)
Ex(τh)
. (5.17)
Hence, all we have left to do in order to show that (5.14) is true, i.e. to conclude the proof,
is to show that (5.17) is non-negative for all x ∈ E. Let us do this.
First consider an arbitrary x ∈ E\∂C . Recall that µ(x), σ(x) and the trajectories of X
are continuous. Note that h ∈ (0, ǫ) implies that the process (Xt)0≤t≤τh with X0 = x
stays in B(x, ǫ). The regularity properties in (ii) therefore imply that the integrand in
(5.17), i.e. e−rt(AXf(Xt, x) − rf(Xt, x)), is a.e. continuous in t a.s. Recall that Xs is
bounded on [0, τh] when h ∈ (0, ǫ). Note also that that if we pick a sufficiently small
h = h(ω) then the integrand in (5.17) is continuous in t a.s, since we can for sufficiently
small h = h(ω) avoid the issue that ∂
2f(x,y)
∂x2 is arbitrarily set to 0 at ∂C . It follows that
we may use the bounded convergence theorem and Lebesgue’s differentiation theorem to
obtain that (5.17) is equal to
− (AXf(x, x) + rf(x, x)) ≥ 0, for x ∈ E\∂C
where the inequality follows from (5.6). Now consider an arbitrary x ∈ ∂C . Replace the
integrand in (5.17) with a right-continuous version (in t a.s.) and use (v) and (5.9) in the
following way
− lim sup
hց0
Ex
(∫ τh
0 e
−rt(AXf(Xt, x)− rf(Xt, x))dt
)
Ex(τh)
= − lim sup
hց0
Ex
(∫ τh
0 limkց0 sup0<l≤k e
−r(t+l)(AXf(Xt+l, x)− rf(Xt+l, x))dt
)
Ex(τh)
≥ − lim sup
z /∈∂C→x
(AXf(z, x)− rf(z, x)) ≥ 0, for x ∈ ∂C.
We have thus shown that (5.17) is non-negative for all x ∈ E.
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Remark 5.3. In the case r > 0 then the condition in (5.10) is not necessary in order for the
verification theorem to be true, since in this case (iii) is sufficient to obtain (5.11) (using
also our convention regarding expected values and infinite stopping times, as described
in the beginning of Section 2).
Remark 5.4. The continuous differentiability requirement (ii) and requirement (iv) imply
that we can approximate the function f(·, y) by the sequence of C2 functions fi(·, y), on
which we can apply the standard Itô formula. After this we let i → ∞ and effectively
find that Dynkin’s formula (5.15) holds. We remark that the continuous differentiability
requirement (ii) could in some settings be relaxed if we instead of using the current ap-
proach were to use a more general version of Itô’s formula based on the concept of local
time, see e.g. [24, 36].
Remark 5.5. Let us underline that we can now apply the standard procedure to use the
verification theorem in order to find equilibriumvalue functions and equilibrium stopping
times in particular cases. More precisely:
(i) Make an ansatz, i.e. make an educated guess of how the solution f(x, y) to the time-
inconsistent variational inequalities should look like. The guess f(x, y) should typ-
ically have traits in common with F (x, y) and involve unspecified parameters, see
e.g. the a, b and x∗ in Example 5.7 below.
(ii) Use the verification theorem to verify that f(x, y) can solve the time-inconsistent
variational inequalities (and the regularity conditions of the verification theorem)
for some specific values of the parameter(s). Note that the point of step (ii) is two-
fold 1) to make sure that the guess f(x, y) has any chance of solving the time-
inconsistent variational inequalities, and 2) to determine the unspecified parame-
ters of f(x, y).
(iii) If the previous steps were successful then you may use the verification theorem
to conclude that the guess f(x, y), with the specified parameter(s), is indeed the
auxiliary function, that J(x) := f(x, x) is the corresponding equilibrium value
function and that τˆ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈ C} is the equilibrium stopping time,
where C := {x ∈ E : f(x, x) > F (x, x)}.
In the setting of the present section we obtain the following result saying under sufficient
regularity it holds for standard (time-consistent) stopping problems that equilibrium stop-
ping times are optimal.
Theorem 5.6. Suppose X is the strong solution to the SDE (5.1) and the function F (x) in
(2.3) is non-negative and continous. Suppose an equilibrium stopping time τˆ for the standard
stopping problem (2.3) exists and the corresponding auxiliary function (Definition 2.3) is
sufficiently regular to be a solution to the time-inconsistent variational inequalities and that
conditions (5.9) and (5.10) are satisfied. Suppose the family {Jτˆ (Xτ ) : τ ≤ τˆ} is uniformly
integrable, for each starting value x ∈ E, where Jτˆ (x) is the equilibrium value function.
Then, τˆ is also an optimal stopping time for (2.3).
Proof. The reward function F (x) in (2.3) does not depend on y. Hence, the auxiliary func-
tion does not depend y, whichmeans that it can be written as fτˆ (x) = Ex(e
−rτˆF (Xτˆ )) =
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Jτˆ (x) — in other words, in this case, the auxiliary function is equal to the equilibrium
value function. It is now easy to see that if Jτˆ (x) solves the time-inconsistent variational
inequalities then it also solves the standard variational inequalities (or equivalently, free
boundary problem) corresponding to the problem of optimal stopping in (2.3), cf. e.g. [31,
Theorem 10.4.1]; hence, standard verification arguments can be used to show that Jτˆ (x)
is in fact also the optimal value function (for the standard theory we refer to [36] and [31,
ch. 10]). The result follows.
Example 5.7. Let us re-analyze the optimistic holder of the perpetual American option
from Example 3.4 using the verification theorem. The advantage here is that we do not
have to solve a sequence of free boundary problems, but can make a direct ansatz for the
value function. Since the state process is a Wiener process it follows that E = R. As
x 7→ e−cx, x 7→ ecx, c = √2r, are the fundamental solutions to AXf = rf and due to
symmetry, a natural guess for a solution to the time-inconsistent variational inequalities
is
f(x, y) =


x , x ≥ x∗,
ae−cx + becx , −x∗ < x < x∗, y ≥ 0
0 , x ≤ −x∗,
and f(x, y) = f(−x,−y), y < 0, with the continuation region C = (−x∗, x∗), for some
parameters a, b and x∗ to be determined. For f(·, y) to be continuous, we need
ae−cx
∗
+ becx
∗
= x∗,
aecx
∗
+ be−cx
∗
= 0.
For sufficient smoothness of f(·, x∗) we furthermore need
−cae−cx∗ + cbecx∗ = 1.
Elementary arguments yield that this system of equations indeed has a solution given by
f(x, y) =


x , x ≥ x∗,
1
2e
cx∗(x∗ − 1c )e−cx + 12e−cx
∗
(x∗ + 1c )e
cx , −x∗ < x < x∗, y ≥ 0
0 , x ≤ −x∗,
where x∗ ∈ (0, 1/c) satisfies
−e4cx∗(x∗ − 1
c
) = x∗ +
1
c
. (5.18)
Using elementary methods one can now verify that:
• x 7→ f(x, y) is convex and ∂f(x∗,y)∂x = 1 for x, y ≥ 0 which implies that C =
(−x∗, x∗) = {x ∈ R : f(x, x)− F (x, x) > 0}, which also implies that (5.9) and
the condition in (5.10) are fulfilled (we remark that the last condition is not neces-
sary since r > 0, cf. Remark 5.3),
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• conditions (5.8), (i), (iii) and (iv) hold.
Let us explicitly verify condition (ii). Naively taking derivatives gives us
∂f(x, y)
∂x
=


1 , x ≥ x∗,
− c2ecx
∗
(x∗ − 1c )e−cx + c2e−cx
∗
(x∗ + 1c )e
cx , −x∗ < x < x∗, y ≥ 0
0 , x ≤ −x∗,
∂f(x, y)
∂x
=


0 , x ≥ x∗,
c
2e
cx∗(x∗ − 1c )ecx − c2e−cx
∗
(x∗ + 1c )e
−cx , −x∗ < x < x∗, y < 0
−1 , x ≤ −x∗.
It is easy to check that these derivatives are well defined except at points (x, y) satisfying
(x, y) = (x∗, y) with y < 0 or (x, y) = (−x∗, y) with y ≥ 0. Hence, for fixed y,
f(·, y) ∈ C1(B(y, ǫ)), for a sufficiently small ǫ > 0. Naively taking derivatives again
gives us
∂2f(x, y)
∂x2
=


0 , x > x∗,
c2
2 e
cx∗(x∗ − 1c )e−cx + c
2
2 e
−cx∗(x∗ + 1c )e
cx , −x∗ < x < x∗, y ≥ 0
0 , x < −x∗,
∂2f(x, y)
∂x2
=


0 , x > x∗,
c2
2 e
cx∗(x∗ − 1c )ecx + c
2
2 e
−cx∗(x∗ + 1c )e
−cx , −x∗ < x < x∗, y < 0
0 , x < −x∗.
We thus see that f(·, y) ∈ C2(B(y, ǫ)\∂C), for any y ∈ E, and that this derivative is
locally bounded. We have thus verified (ii). Now use that c =
√
2r and the above to
obtain
AXf(x, y)− rf(x, y) = 12 ∂
2f(x,y)
∂x2
− rf(x, y)
=


−rx < 0 , x > x∗,
0 , −x∗ < x < x∗, y ≥ 0
0 , x < −x∗,
AXf(x, y)− rf(x, y) = 12 ∂
2f(x,y)
∂x2
− rf(x, y)
=


0 , x > x∗,
0 , −x∗ < x < x∗, y < 0
rx < 0 , x < −x∗.
This means that (5.6), (5.7) and (v) are also satisfied. We have thus verified that the func-
tion f(x, y)with x∗ determined in (5.18) is a solution to the time-inconsistent variational
inequalities. The verification theorem therefore implies that τˆ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈
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(−x∗, x∗)} is an equilibrium stopping time and that the corresponding equilibrium value
function is
J(x) =


x , x ≥ x∗,
1
2e
cx∗(x∗ − 1c )e−cx + 12e−cx
∗
(x∗ + 1c )e
cx , 0 ≤ x < x∗,
1
2e
cx∗(x∗ − 1c )ecx + 12e−cx
∗
(x∗ + 1c )e
−cx , −x∗ < x < 0,
−x , x ≤ −x∗.
Example 5.8. Equilibrium selling strategies under endogenous habit formation
and exponential utility. We will now study a model for selling strategies under expo-
nential utility and endogenous habit formation, using the verification theorem. Section
1.1 contains information about previous literature on related problems.
Consider an investor who wishes to optimally dispose of an asset in a Black-Scholes mar-
ket. Specifically, the price of the asset, measured in e.g USD or MUSD, is given by the
processX satisfying
dXt = σXtdWt.
Wemodel the utility of the investor as exponential, but we also let her utility be inversely
related to the present price of the asset, which makes the problem time-inconsistent.
Specifically, we assume that the agent wishes to maximize
Ex
(
e−rτ
(
1− e−a(Xτ+g(x)−k)
))
,
where a, r, k > 0 are constants and g : [0,∞)→ R is a non-increasing bounded function
such that x 7→ x+ g(x) is non-decreasing and g(0) = 0.
We will study this endogenous habit formation selling problemwithoutmaking any func-
tional assumptions for g(·). In Figure 2, we present the solution to the problem for a
particular specification of g(·).
Remark 5.9. The reward function of the present model corresponds to the function
F (x, y) := 1−e−a(x+g(y)−k), which is clearly time-inconsistent and bounded on [0,∞)2.
If g(·) = 0 and k = 0 then we recover a standard exponential utility function.
Remark 5.10. We interpret this model as the investor having formed a habit regarding
what she thinks the asset should be worth, and the larger the current value of the asset
is the less happy she will be for a given selling price in the future. The parameter a
is a measure of the risk aversion of the investor: a larger a means more risk aversion.
The parameter r is a measure of the impatience of the investor: a larger r means more
impatience. The nonstandard feature of this model is the function g(·)which we interpret
to be a measure of the habit formation of the investor. The assumption that g(·) is non-
increasing is interpreted as follows: the smaller the current price x is, the happier the
investor is given the same future selling price. The assumption that x 7→ x + g(x) is
increasing means that the investor cannot become less happy for a larger selling price
given immediately selling. The parameter k allows the possibility for negative utility.
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A reasonable starting point is to try with a one-sided solution C = (0, x∗). We therefore
guess that the auxiliary function is
f(x, y) =


1− e−a(x+g(y)−k) , x ≥ x∗,
Ex
(
e−rτ[x∗,∞)
(
1− e−a
(
Xτ[x∗,∞)+g(y)−k
)))
, 0 < x < x∗,
for some x∗ to be determined. Using standard theory, see e.g [31, ch. 9,10], we note that
the function f(x, y) can be simplified using
Ex
(
e−rτ[x∗,∞)
(
1− e−a
(
Xτ[x∗,∞)+g(y)−k
)))
=
( x
x∗
)γ (
1− e−a(x∗+g(y)−k)
)
where γ = 12 +
√
1
4 +
2r
σ2
. Naively taking derivatives therefore gives us
∂f(x, y)
∂x
=
{
ae−a(x+g(y)−k) , x ≥ x∗,
γ x
γ−1
x∗γ
(
1− e−a(x∗+g(y)−k)) , 0 < x < x∗.
In order for (ii) to be fulfilled x∗ must satisfy
x∗ae−a(x
∗+g(x∗)−k) = γ
(
1− e−a(x∗+g(x∗)−k)
)
(5.19)
which means that x∗ must be the zero of the function
H(x) = γ − e−a(x+g(x)−k)(γ + ax), (5.20)
which must be verified to exist uniquely in (0,∞) for the particular choice of g(·). Note
that a unique x∗ exists if there is no habit formation i.e. with g(·) = 0; to see this note
that if g(·) = 0 then H(0) = γ(1 − eak) < 0 and H ′(x) = ae−a(x−k)(ax + γ − 1) > 0
on [0,∞), since γ > 1.
Taking derivatives again gives us
∂2f(x, y)
∂x2
=
{
−a2e−a(x+g(y)−k) , x > x∗,
γ(γ − 1)xγ−2x∗γ
(
1− e−a(x∗+g(y)−k)) , 0 < x < x∗.
Using AXf(x, y) =
1
2x
2σ2 ∂
2f(x,y)
∂x2
and γ(γ − 1) = 2r
σ2
, we obtain
AXf(x, y)− rf(x, y) =
=
{
−x22 σ2a2e−a(x+g(y)−k) − r
(
1− e−a(x+g(y)−k)) , x > x∗,
x2
2 σ
2 2r
σ2
xγ−2
x∗γ
(
1− e−a(x∗+g(y)−k))− r ( xx∗ )γ (1− e−a(x∗+g(y)−k)) , 0 < x < x∗,
=
{
−x22 σ2a2e−a(x−g(y)−k) − r
(
1− e−a(x+g(y)−k)) , x > x∗,
0 , 0 < x < x∗,
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which implies that f(x, y) satisfies (5.7). It follows from (5.19) that x∗ + g(x∗)− k > 0,
which since x+ g(x) is non-decreasing implies that
AXf(x, x)−rf(x, x) = −x
2
2
σ2a2e−a(x+g(x)−k)−r
(
1− e−a(x+g(x)−k)
)
< 0, x > x∗.
Hence, (5.6) is satisfied. Condition (v) is verified in the same way. Conditions (i), (ii), (iii)
and (iv) are directly verified. Now, if g(·) is such that
C := (0, x∗) = {x ∈ R : f(x, x)− F (x, x) > 0} (5.21)
holds then conditions (5.8) and (5.9) follow, and all the conditions of the verification the-
orem are hence fulfilled (the condition in (5.10) is not necessary in this case, cf. Remark
5.3).
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Figure 2 x 7→ J(x) (solid) and x 7→ F (x, x) (dashed), with g(x) = arccot(x) − pi
2
, here x∗ ≈
3.3524. x 7→ J(x) (densely dotted) and x 7→ F (x, x) (dotted), with g(x) = 0, here
x∗ ≈ 1.3412. x 7→ arccot(x)− pi
2
(dash-dotted). a = 0.7, r = 0.1, k = 0.5 and σ = 1.
To show that (5.21) holds for the case g(·) = 0 it is sufficient to show that( x
x∗
)γ (
1− e−a(x∗−k)
)
> 1− e−a(x−k), 0 < x < x∗.
This is trivially true if the right side is non-positive since the left side is positive by (5.19),
and we may thus treat the right side and the left side as positive. It is therefore sufficient
to show that
κ(x) :=
x∗γ
1− e−a(x∗−k)x
−γ
(
1− e−a(x−k)
)
< 1, 0 < x < x∗.
We obtain that κ′(x) = x
∗γ
1−e−a(x∗−k)x
−γ−1(−H(x)), and since x∗ is assumed to be the
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unique zero ofH(·) andH(0) < 0 it follows that κ′(x) > 0, where we also used (5.19) to
see that the first fraction in κ(x) is positive. Since κ(x∗) = 1 it follows that κ(x∗) < 1
for 0 < x < x∗ and we are done. In order to show that (5.21) holds when g(·) 6= 0, we
must show that( x
x∗
)γ (
1− e−a(x∗−k)e−ag(x)
)
> 1− e−a(x−k)e−ag(x), 0 < x < x∗.
This is trivially true if the right side is non-positive; to see this use that the left side is
positive by (5.19) and since g(·) is non-increasing. We may thus treat both the left and
the right sides as positive; and since 1 − e−a(x−k) > 1 − e−a(x−k)e−ag(x) we may also
treat 1− e−a(x−k) as positive. It is thus enough to show that (x∗x )γ 1−e−a(x−k)e−ag(x)1−e−a(x∗−k)e−ag(x) <
1, 0 < x < x∗. But 1−e
−a(x−k)e−ag(x)
1−e−a(x∗−k)e−ag(x) <
1−e−a(x−k)
1−e−a(x∗−k) and the result follows from the
case when g(·) = 0.
We conclude that if g(·) is such that H(·) in (5.20) has a unique zero x∗, then the equi-
librium stopping time is τˆ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ x∗} and the equilibrium value function
is
J(x) =
{
1− e−a(x+g(x)−k) , x ≥ x∗,(
x
x∗
)γ (
1− e−a(x∗+g(x)−k)) , 0 < x < x∗.
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